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Lifting the Export Ban on Alaskan Oil: A
Trilateral Trade Proposal
by Steven R. Perles*
I. OVERVIEW
n 1968 oil was discovered at Prudhoe Bay, Alaska. Environmentalists
sought to block commercialization of the field. However, Congress in-
tervened and authorized construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Sys-
tem.' As part of a political compromise needed to ensure Congressional
authorization, export restrictions, intended to severely hamper the export
of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System crude oil to Japan, were placed
upon the pipeline's throughput.
Subsequent to the passage of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authoriza-
tion Act,2 Congress, in the form of an amendment to the Export Adminis-
tration Act,3 effectively banned the export of crude oil from Prudhoe Bay.
The ban, rather than assisting U.S. energy policy, has worked to its detri-
ment, as well as adversely affecting two of America's allies, Mexico and
Japan.
Japan, with the third largest economy in the world, is entirely depen-
dent upon imported oil.4 The bulk of Japan's oil comes from the Middle
East. As Japan learned during the Iranian hostage crisis,5 the Middle
East's political instability poses substantial energy-security problems. If
Alaskan oil exports were decontrolled, one-third to one-half of the pro-
* J.D., William and Mary; B.A., University of Alaska; Formerly Chief Legislative Assis-
tant to Senator Ted Stevens (R-Alaska, Republican Whip), the author is presently in pri-
vate practice.
The author would like to thank his law clerk, Mr. Craig B. Young, for his assistance in
researching and drafting this article, and his secretary, Ms. Karen Arbogast, without whose
diligent efforts this work could not have been completed. Special thanks are given to Mr.
Sheldon Z. Kaplan (B.A., Yale University, B.A. in Jurisprudence, Oxford; M.A. in Jurispru-
dence, Oxford) for his assistance in the preparation of the portion of this article dealing
with Mexico.
I Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 203, 87 Stat. 576, 584
(1973).
2 Id.
- Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2406(d) (Supp. V 1981).
4 See infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text.
5 See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
duction would go to Japan; this would substantially decrease Japan's de-
pendence on Middle Eastern oil. The problem is so acute for Japan that
the issue was discussed by President Reagan and Prime Minister
Nakasone during the Prime Minister's visit to the United States in Janu-
ary, 1983.6
Mexico has substantial oil reserves but is on the verge of bankruptcy.
Export controls on Alaskan oil force some of that oil to be shipped to
states along the Gulf of Mexico, displacing oil that could be sold by the
Mexicans.
This article proposes the establishment of a trilateral trade agree-
ment between Alaska, Japan and Mexico. Under this proposal, Alaskan
oil presently shipped to the Gulf of Mexico would go to Japan, replacing
Middle Eastern oil, and Mexican oil would replace the Alaskan oil going
to the Gulf of Mexico. This proposed system of trade would effectively
divert the present revenue stream which flows from Japan to the Middle
East, into Mexico. This proposal would have no balance of trade impact
on the United States.
The benefits of trilateral trade to the United States would be sub-
stantial. The decreased transportation charges for the delivery of Alaskan
crude would increase the well-head value of the crude resulting in over
one billion dollars per year in additional revenue accruing to the federal
government and the State of Alaska.7 U.S. security interest with Japan
would be enhanced and, as a major supplier of oil to Japan, our leverage
at trade negotiations would markedly increase. The contribution of a tri-
lateral trade agreement to Mexican solvency would enhance U.S. security
interests in Latin America and help to prevent a financial crisis for Amer-
ican banks that have loaned money to Mexico.
The establishment of a trilateral trade would require an amendment
to section 7(d) of the Export Administration Act of 1979.8 Pragmatically,
the only other way Alaskan crude oil will be sold to Japan is through a
repeal of section 7(d).9 For a variety of political reasons, it would be eas-
ier to convince Congress to amend the Act rather than repeal section 7(d).
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF CONTROLS ON ALASKAN OIL
To understand the importance of section 7(d) and its impact on cur-
rent world energy and economic problems, it is useful to first review the
legislative history of export controls in the United States, and specifically
the history of the enactment of this section.
6 See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
7 See infra note 192.
8 50 U.S.C. app. § 2406(d) (Supp. V 1981).
9 See infra note 12 and accompanying text.
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Currently, section 7(d) of the Export Administration Act of 197910
provides that crude oil produced in Alaska may not be exported from the
United States. The statute does provide, however, for three limited ex-
ceptions: (1) Alaskan crude oil may be exported to Canada or Mexico if it
is refined and consumed there in exchange for the same quantity of crude
oil imported back into the United States from that country;1 ' (2) Alaskan
10 Id. Section 7(d) provides:
(d) Domestically produced crude oil. - (1) Notwithstanding any other provi-
sion of this Act [sections 2401 to 2420 of this Appendix] and not withstanding
subsection (u) of section 28 of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 (30 U.S.C. 185), no
domestically produced crude oil transported by pipeline over right-of-way granted
pursuant to section 203 of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (43 U.S.C.
1652)(except any such crude oil which (A) is exported to an adjacent foreign coun-
try to be refined and consumed therein in exchange for the same quantity of crude
oil being exported from that country to the United States; such exchange must
result through convenience or increased efficiency of transportation in lower prices
for consumers of petroleum products in the United States as described in para-
graph (2)(A)(ii) of this subsection, or (B) is temporarily exported for convenience
or increased efficiency of transportation across parts of an adjacent foreign coun-
try and reenters the United States) may be exported from the United States, or
any of its territories and possessions, unless the requirements of paragraph (2) of
this subsection are met.
(2) Crude oil subject to the prohibition contained in paragraph (1) may be
exported only if-
(A) the President makes and publishes express findings that exports of such
crude oil, including exchanges-
(i) will not diminish the total quantity or quality of petroleum refined within,
stored within, or legally committed to be transported to and sold within the
United States;
(ii) will, within 3 months following the initiation of such exports or exchanges,
result in (I) acquisition costs to the refiners which purchase the imported crude oil
being lower than the acquisition costs such refiners would have to pay for the
domestically produced oil in the absence of such an export or exchange, and (II)
not less than 75 percent of such savings in costs being reflected in wholesale and
retail prices of products refined from such imported crude oil;
(iii) will be made only pursuant to contracts which may be terminated if the
crude oil supplies of the United States are interrupted, threatened, or diminished;
(iv) are clearly necessary to protect the national interest; and
(v) are in accordance with the provisions of this Act [sections 2401 to 2420 of
this Appendix]; and
(B) the President reports such findings to the Congress and the Congress,
within 60 days thereafter, agrees to a concurrent resolution approving such ex-
ports on the basis of the findings.
(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section or any other provision
of law, including subsection (u) of section 28 of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920
[30 U.S.C. § 185(u)], the President may export oil to any country pursuant to a
bilaterial international oil supply agreement entered into by the United States
with such nation before June 25, 1979, or to any country pursuant to the Interna-
tional Emergency Oil Sharing Plan of the International Energy Agency.
1 Id. § 2406(d)(1)(A).
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crude oil may be exported if the President expressly finds that such ex-
ports will not diminish total quantities or quality of petroleum products
in the United States, that acquisition costs to refiners are reduced as a
result, that the savings are passed on to consumers, and that Congress
approves of such exports within 60 days after the President's findings are
given to Congress;12 or, (3) Alaskan crude oil may be exported to Israel as
part of the "Camp David Peace Plan" between Israel and Egypt.13 The
effect of these exceptions, however, is to do little more than give Congress
approval power over any effort by the President to enter into interna-
tional exchange arrangements involving Alaskan produced oil.
In reviewing the legislative history, three points will be made. First,
the prohibition on exporting Alaskan crude oil runs counter to the rea-
sons export controls have been in effect in the United States since 1949.
Second, the enactment and subsequent efforts to repeal the prohibition
have historically come before Congress at times when the United States
has been involved in major world economic conflicts involving energy,
thereby clouding the issues. Third, and closely related to the first two,
Congressional prohibition of exporting Alaskan crude oil can be viewed as
a case study of the American political system and the problems caused by
a lack of intelligent communication between Congress and its
constituents.14
A. The Export Control Act of 1949
Prior to 1949, export controls in the United States were primarily
limited to the curtailment or prohibition of exporting military equipment
and related items.15 In 1949, upon the expiration of prior export control
12 Id. § 2406(d)(2)(A) & (B). See also infra note 50.
13 Id. § 2406(d)(3).
14 As demonstrated by the legislative history of the prohibition against Alaskan oil ex-
ports, a major reason for House support of the prohibition has been the concern of Con-
gressmen that their constituents would vote to remove them from office if Alaskan oil was
exported at a time when the United States was facing major energy shortages, long lines at
the gas pumps, and rapidly rising fuel prices. Elected every two years, House members are
far more responsive to constituent pressure. As such, the proposals for the prohibition have
principally arisen in the House of Representatives, introduced by members representing ar-
eas of the United States hardest hit by the Arab oil embargo of 1973. See, e.g., infra note 62
and accompanying text.
11 Act of July 2, 1940, Pub. L. No. 703, § 6, 54 Stat. 712, 714 (1940). This act authorized
the President to prohibit or curtail the export of military equipment or munitions and re-
lated items, and imposed penalties for violations. The geographic scope of this section was
clarified by the Act of May 28, 1941, Pub. L. No. 76, 55 Stat. 206 (1941). The Act of June 30,
1942, Pub. L. No. 638, 56 Stat. 463 (1942) broadened the power to cover "any articles, tech-
nical data, materials or supplies." The section was extended regularly until 1949 when Con-
gress passed a more comprehensive statute. Export Control Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 11, 63
Stat. 7 (1949). For a complete legislative history of the 1949 act, see S. REP. No. 31, 81st
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laws, Congress passed a more comprehensive statute' 6 establishing a
wider purpose for export controls "to protect the domestic economy by
limiting exports of scarce materials, and to channel exports to countries
where need is greatest and where our foreign-policy and national security
interests would be best served."'" The pre-1949 export controls were pri-
marily used during World War II. After the war, some controls were
maintained in an effort to reduce inflation which had been created by
abnormal foreign demand for U.S. supplies. The government sought, how-
ever, to decontrol exports, but when supply situations did not improve,
the Department of Commerce made use of quotas and limited licenses. 18
Congress placed the power to control exports completely within the hands
of the President and intended it to be a flexible control, allowing quick
response to changing world and national events.
Shortages of oil and other petroleum products were of concern to the
country in 1949 just as they are today. For supply reasons petroleum was
among the major commodities under the Export Control Act of 1949. The
Senate noted, in its passage of the 1949 Export Control Act, that "[a]
careful check has had to be maintained on the volume of exports [of pe-
'troleum] ... because petroleum continues to be in tight world supply."' 9
Congress did not, at that time, see any need to specifically direct the
President not to export any U.S. produced oil or petroleum products even
though, as the Senate further noted, "The balance in supply and demand
was achieved in this country in 1948 by importing more petroleum than
we export. This is a basic change from prewar when, in 1939 for example,
we exported five times as much as we imported. '2
0
Since 1949, the Export Control Act has been regularly reenacted and
extended for two- and three-year periods. The only significant change oc-
cured in 1965 when Congress amended the act to include an anti-boycott
policy opposing restrictive trade practices or boycotts imposed by foreign
countries against other countries friendly to the United States.
2
'
B. Export Control and the Environment: Issues in the Early 1970's
In 1969, Congress undertook to revise the export controls and enact a
more comprehensive statement of policy for the President to follow.
While the President's plenary power to control exports for reasons of na-
Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), reprinted in 1949 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1094.
16 Export Control Act of 1949, Pub. L. No. 11, 63 Stat. 7 (1949).
17 S. REP. No. 31, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949), reprinted in 1949 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 1094.
18 Id. at 1095.
19 Id. at 1104.
20 Id.
"I Export Control Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-63, § 3, 79 Stat. 209 (1965).
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tional security, foreign policy and short supply were maintained,22 Con-
gress found it necessary to insert a stronger statement of policy to include
concerns for the domestic economy.23 The Conference Committee Report
on the 1969 Act explained that export controls were also to be used "to
further the sound growth and stability of our economy. '24 This was fol-
lowed in 1972, however, by the Equal Export Opportunity Act25 which
amended the Export Administration Act of 1969 with specific directions
that the President decontrol certain U.S. exports. Section 4(b) of the Ex-
port Administration Act was amended to read, in part:
[T]he President shall remove unilateral export controls on the export
from the United States of articles, materials, or supplies, including tech-
nical data or other information, which he determines are available with-
out restriction from sources outside the United States in significant
quantities and comparable in quality to those produced in the United
States, except that any such control may remain in effect if the President
determines that adequate evidence has been presented to him demon-
strating that the absence of such a control would prove detrimental to
the national security of the United States.2"
The Senate Report on the 1972 Act explained that the reasons for this
change in policy was "to facilitate prompt removal of United States uni-
lateral export controls which are not necessary to protect our national
security, [and] to insure thrat the commercial and technical expertise of
private industry is utilized as effectively as possible in the administration
of export controls."2
The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs ex-
plained this apparent reversal in the trend of export controls by stating:
The Committee believes that Title I of this legislation is needed because
the United States is handicapping itself by continuing to control the ex-
port of many items which are not of strategic value and are not con-
trolled by our foreign competitors. While it is essential to the national
security that the government continue to restrict the export of some
items to Communist countries, the Committee believes that restricting
the export of items which can be bought freely from our Western Euro-
pean or Japanese competitors does not benefit the national security. Ex-
cessive restrictions result in a worsened balance of payments situation,
fewer export sales for American industries, and fewer jobs for American
22 CONF. REP. No. 681, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 2716, 2717.
2 Export Administration Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-184, § 3, 83 Stat. 841 (1969).
24 CONF. REP. No. 681, supra note 22.
25 Pub. L. No. 92-412, 86 Stat. 644 (1972).
20 See id.
27 S. REP. No. 890, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CoDE CONG. &
An. NEws 3085.
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workers. 28
The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 29 and the Conference Com-
mittee"0 adopted this language in their respective reports on the 1972 Act.
As a result, a Congressional intent to decontrol exports in 1972 for eco-
nomic reasons was established.
In 1968 the Atlantic Richfield Company discovered oil at Prudhoe
Bay in Alaska, and shortly thereafter a rush began to develop and to pro-
duce what promised to be one of the largest oil reserves in the United
States. Oil companies worked to develop the technology necessary to ex-
tract and transport the newly found oil and attempted to secure the nec-
essary state and federal permits. However, a major oil spill off the coast
of Santa Barbara, California occurred in 1969 and caused a major politi-
cal roadblock in the production of the Alaskan oil.
In 1969 Congress was working on legislation to establish a national
environmental policy. Following the Santa Barbara oil spill, the Senate
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs held a one-day hearing31 and,
at least in part based on the experience of the oil spill, an "action-forc-
ing" measure was added to the National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 (NEPA).32 The measure required federal agencies to prepare envi-
ronmental impact statements on all proposed actions which might signifi-
cantly affect the environment. 33 NEPA was signed into law on January 1,
1970, and less than four months later an injunction was issued to stop the
Department of Interior from approving the construction of the Trans-
Alaska pipeline until an environmental impact statement was prepared.2 4
As a result, two years were spent preparing the environmental impact
statement, and an additional year was spent in the courts after the Inte-
rior Department again decided to approve the pipeline on May 11, 1972.35
It finally took an Act of Congress to clear the environmental roadblocks.36
2 Id. at 3086.
29 S. RE. No. 981, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 3099.
So CONF. REP. No. 1342, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 3103.
3, National Environmental Policy Act, 1969: Hearings on S. 1075 Before the Senate
Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
32 National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-190, 83 Stat. 852 (1969).
33 Id. § 102(2)(c).
, Wilderness Soc'y v. Hickel, 325 F. Supp. 422 (D.D.C. 1970).
25 BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, CHRONOLOGIcAL LISTING OF MAJOR ACrIVITIEs: TAPS
PROJECT (master file).
" For a further discussion of the fight in Congress over the environmental issues sur-
rounding the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, see Corrigan & Varfield, Energy Report: Pipeline
Lobby Uses its Political Muscle to Bypass Environmental Law, 5 NAT'L J. REP. 1172 (1973).
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The Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act 7 (TAPS) authorized and
directed the Secretary of the Interior to take whatever appropriate ac-
tions were necessary for the construction, operation, and maintenance of
the pipeline.38 In the process, Congress declared: "The early development
and delivery of oil and gas from Alaska's North Slope to domestic mar-
kets is in the national interest because of growing domestic shortages and
increasing dependence upon insecure foreign sources. 39
In the 1974 amendments to the Export Administration Act of 1969,40
Congress began to show more concern for controlling exports of supplies
and materials that were scarce in the domestic market. Section 3(2)(A) of
the Act was amended to remove the word "abnormal" in the definition of
foreign demand of scarce materials.41 "Under the change ... it will no
longer be necessary for foreign demand to be abnormal before export con-
trols may be imposed. Instead, controls may be used when foreign de-
mand results or will result in both an excessive drain of scarce materials
and serious inflation.' 42 Thus, Congress acted to make it easier to impose
export controls on "short supply" items.
Significantly, even though the Arab oil embargo of 1973 had already
begun, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs
made a special point that it would be U.S. policy to make essential raw
materials such as oil available for exportation in order not to disrupt in-
ternational economic development. 4' Thus, section 2 of the Export Ad-
ministration Act of 1969 was amended to provide that "unreasonable re-
strictions on access to world supplies can cause worldwide political and
economic instability, interfere with free international trade, and retard
the growth and development of nations.""
"' Pub. L. No. 92-153, 87 Stat. 576 (1973).
38 Id. § 203(b).
39 Id. § 202(a) (emphasis added).
40 Export Administration Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-500, 88 Stat. 1552
(1974).
41 Id. § 2. For the original language, see Pub. L. No. 91-184, 83 Stat. 841 (1969).
42 S. REP. No. 1024, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 6234, 6235. The Conference Report stated:
It is the intent of the conferees that export regulations implementing this policy
reflect that foreign demand need not be the major cause of serious inflation in the
price of a commodity as a condition to permit the use of export controls. It is
sufficient that such demand be a significant factor in causing inflation in the price.
It is also the intent of the conferees that controls should be imposed to prevent an
excessive drain of scarce materials from taking place and that controls need not be
held in abeyance until such an excessive drain has actually occurred.
CONF. REP. No. 1412, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS, 6243, 6244.
43 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1024, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 6234, 6238.
" Pub. L. No. 93-500, § 4(a)(5), 88 Stat. 1552, 1553 (1974).
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C. Prelude to Controls on Alaskan Oil Exports
In November of 1973 a limitation was placed on the President's ple-
nary power over export controls with the passage of the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline Authorization Act.45 Of significance was Title I of the Act which
amended section 28 of the Mineral Leasing Act of 19206 by placing cer-
tain limitations on the export of Alaskan oil.47 The amendment specifi-
cally subjected the exporting of "domestically produced crude oil trans-
ported by pipeline over rights-of-way granted pursuant to Section 28 of
the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920" to the Export Administration Act of
1969.8 Further, while leaving the President with basic authority to ap-
prove such exports, the amendment required that he submit a finding to
Congress that such exports "will not diminish the total quantity or quali-
ty of petroleum available to the United States, and are in the national
interest. '49 The restriction on the President's plenary power was the pro-
vision that Congress could, within 60 calendar days, by a concurrent reso-
lution, disapprove such Presidential findings and cease such
exportation."
45 Pub. L. No. 93-153, 87 Stat. 576 (1973) (codified in scattered sections of Code).
46 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1976).
47 See Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 101, 87 Stat. 576 (1973) which provides:
(u) Any domestically produced crude oil transported by pipeline over rights-of-
way granted pursuant to [this section], except such crude oil which is either ex-
changed in similar quantity for convenience or increased efficiency of transporta-
tion with persons or the government of an adjacent foreign state, or which is tem-
porarily exported for convenience or increased efficiency of transportation across
parts of an adjacent foreign state and reenters the United States, shall be subject
to all of the limitations and licensing requirements of the Export Administration
Act of 1969 ... and, in addition, before any crude oil subject to this section may
be exported under the limitations and licensing requirements and penalty and en-
forcement provisions of the Export Administration Act of 1969 the President must
make and publish an express finding that such exports will not diminish the total
quantity or quality of petroleum available to the United States, and are in the
national interest and are in accord with the provisions of the Export Administra-
tion Act of 1969: Provided, That the President shall submit reports to the Con-
gress containing findings made under this section, and after the date of receipt of
such report Congress shall have a period of sixty calendar days, thirty days of
which Congress must have been in session, to consider whether exports under the
terms of this section are in the national interest. If the Congress within this time
period passes a concurrent resolution of disapproval stating disagreement with the
President's finding concerning the national interest, further exports made pursu-
ant to the aforementioned Presidential findings shall cease.
48 Id.
49 Id.
1 Id. The legislative veto is a relatively recent phenomenon but not at all uncommon.
Over the past five decades, this device has been placed in nearly 200 statutes. However, in
Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, -U.S.-, 103 S. Ct. 2764 (1983), the Su-
preme Court held the one House veto provision in section 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and
1983
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The amendment was specifically aimed at the new Alaskan North
Slope oil51 based on Congressional concerns that the oil companies had
selected the route for the Trans-Alaska Pipeline in order to facilitate ex-
portation of the North Slope oil in Japan.5 2 Congress did not believe,
however, that an outright ban on exporting Alaskan oil was necessary
and, in fact, Congress recognized that a swap of Alaskan oil to Japan in
exchange for other, more accessible oil for the East Coast could be
beneficial .5
After the effect of the Arab Oil Embargo of 1973 was felt in the
United States, Congress found that the "[c]ontinuing dependence on for-
eign petroleum, and the economic consequences of another embargo, re-
quire that the United States take steps to effectively reduce its vulnera-
bility to future import interruptions."'" In 1975 the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act 55 was passed giving the President standby authority to
deal with future energy supply emergencies, including authority to carry
out the International Energy Program by prescribing rules and regula-
tions for international oil allocations. 56
U.S. export control policy in the mid-1970's was not significantly dif-
ferent from that which had prevailed at the end of World War H and
when the first major export control legislation was enacted in 1949. There
were still three major objectives supporting all export controls: (1) na-
tional security controls, primarily directed at keeping sensitive supplies
and materials, as well as technology, out of Communist countries; (2)
short supply controls, aimed at insuring that scarce materials were not
exported; and, (3) foreign policy controls, mainly in the areas of interna-
tional economics with some policy directives regarding international boy-
cotts of friendly nations.
By 1977, however, some very significant events had developed which
began to affect the United States. First, the national economy was being
severely strained due to the economic pressures being placed upon the
United States and other nations by the Organization of Petroleum Ex-
Nationality Act to be unconstitutional. This holding was based on the finding that the Con-
gressional veto is legislative action, and as such, must adhere to the bicameralism and pre-
sentment requirements of Article I of the Constitution. While this case involved a one
House veto provision, it is possible that all legislative vetoes are suspect under this decision.
51 S. REP. No. 207, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973), reprinted in 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2417, 2431.
52 Id.
53 See, e.g., statement of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, id. at
2433.
H.R. REP. No. 340, 94th Cong. 1st Sess. (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1762, 1782.
" 42 U.S.C. §§ 6201-6442 (1976).
-Id. § 6271(a).
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porting Countries (OPEC). Secondly, the Arab boycott of Israel was in
full effect, and political pressure from Jewish lobbying groups in the
United States was evident in Congress. It was against this background
that Congress, in 1977, undertook to amend the Export Administration
Act. The principal change which Congress set out to make in the Act was
a strengthening of U.S. policy against compliance with foreign boycotts.57
The Arab boycott of Israel led the way to the first major change in
export controls in the United States since 1965-the reduction of the
President's plenary authority over export controls. 8 By early 1977 many
members of Congress felt there had been a failure on the part of the Ex-
ecutive Branch to effectively react to the Arab boycott.5 9 Congress was
displeased with the manner in which the President was carrying out his
plenary powers over export controls. The'result of this displeasure was
partially felt when the House of Representatives included in the 1977
amendments to the Export Administration Act specific restrictions on the
exportation of Alaskan oil set to flow through the Trans-Alaska
pipeline.6 0
D. Export Administration Amendments of 1977: Control of Alaskan Oil
Exports
The principal objectives of the 1977 amendments to the Export Ad-
ministration Act were to improve the licensing procedure for exportation,
to make it easier and quicker for business and industry to receive permis-
sion to export certain items, and to strengthen U.S. policy against the
Arab boycott of Israel."' Significantly, neither the House bill nor the Sen-
ate bill, as originally introduced, contained language to control or limit
Presidential power to export Alaskan oil. Such language was introduced
as an amendment to the House bill by Representative Stewart B. McKin-
ney of Connecticut.6 2
"' See, e.g., 123 CONG. REC. 11,420 (1977) (statement of Congressman William Broom-
field of Michigan).
68 See Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, 91 Stat. 235
(1977).
9 See, e.g., 123 CONG. REc. 11,424 (1977) (statement of Congressman Dante Fascell of
Florida).
6o Export Administration Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-52, § 110, 91 Stat. 235,
239 (1977).
11 See, e.g., 123 CONG. REc. 11,418 (1977) (introductory statement of Representative
Clement Zablocki); 123 CONG. REc. 13,769 (1977) (introductory statement of Senator Adlai
Stevenson).
62 Rep. McKinney's amendment read as follows:
Prohibition of Certain Petroleum Exports
Section 110. Section 4 of the Export Administration Act of 1969, as amended
by sections 107, 108, and 109 of this Act, is further amended by adding at the end
1983
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On April 18, 1977, President Carter declared that the energy crisis in
the United States was the "moral equivalent of war." 3 Two days later,
Representative McKinney used that declaration as a justification to intro-
duce export controls on Alaskan oil:
[W]e have before us a bill (H.R. 5840) which, as written, could be used to
justify the exportation of 400,000 barrels per day of Alaskan oil .... It
would be incomprehensible to expect that the administration and this
Congress can convince the American people of severe supply shortages
while we simultaneously export nearly a half million barrels of oil per
day to Japan. 4
McKinney adopted the language which Congress inserted into the
Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act 5 to convince his colleagues that
the amendment was consistent with the basic intent of the Export Ad-
ministration Act:
The amendment will further insure the fulfillment of our specific intent
in passing the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act-TAPS
Act-the domestic distribution of Alaskan oil.... As dictated by Section
28(U) of the Mineral Leasing Act-as amended by the TAPS Act-the
President can only approve the export of North Slope crude if he deter-
mines it will benefit the national interest. As you may recall, the 93d
Congress, in approving the TAPS Act, determined that the national in-
terest would best be served by distributing the North Slope crude
domestically16
Some Congressmen argued that the debate regarding exportation of Alas-
kan oil should not be taking place in the context of an amendment to the
Export Administration Act; rather, it should be taking place after the
President presented his proposals for a comprehensive energy program,
thereof the following new subsection:
(m) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act and notwithstanding
subsection (u) of Section 28 of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, no domestically
produced crude oil transported by pipeline over rights-of-way granted pursuant to
such section 28 (except any such crude oil which (1) is exchanged in similar quan-
tity for convenience or increased efficiency of transportation across parts of an
adjacent foreign state and reenters the United States, its territories and posses-
sions, during the two-year period beginning on the date of enactment of this
subsection.
123 CONG. REC. 11,441-42 (1977).
83 Television Address by James E. Carter, President of the United States, Apr. 18,
1977.
123 CONG. REc. 11,442 (1977).
65 Pub. L. No. 93-153, § 202(a), 87 Stat. 576, 584 (1973).
66 123 CONG. REc. 11,442 (1977) (emphasis added). Representative Don Young of
Alaska also favored the export ban on Alaskan oil. See id. at 11,443-44. While Congressman
Young may have been more concerned with getting the Alaskan oil to market than with the
energy crisis, his support was important for the McKinney Amendment.
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and then, only if the President found that Alaskan oil should be shipped
to Japan.6 7 Faced with the prospect of having to explain the apparent
inconsistency between rationing fuels in the United States while at the
same time exporting domestically produced oil overseas, after the Presi-
dent's declaration of the imminent perils of the growing energy shortage,
the House adopted the McKinney Amendment by a voice vote and sent
the legislation to the Senate for further debate.
In the Senate, as in the House, the purpose of the Export Adminis-
tration Amendments of 1977 was to improve the licensing procedures for
exports and to strengthen the U.S. anti-boycott policy. After the debates
on the House bill, Senators John A. Durkin and Thomas J. McIntyre of
New Hampshire introduced an amendment similar to the one that had
already passed in the House to prohibit exportation of Alaskan oil."8
The Carter administration opposed both the McKinney Amendment
in the House and the Durkin Amendment in the Senate because the
amendments eroded the powers of the President to control exports.69
Support for the Durkin Amendment was centered on the TAPS Act
language which declared that domestic use of Alaskan oil was in the na-
tional interest. It should be noted that the need for the TAPS Act arose
due to the opposition to the pipeline from environmental groups in the
United States.70 Congress, at the time, was faced with the difficult situa-
'7 See, e.g., 123 CONG. REc. 11,444 (1977) (statement of Congressman Jonathan Bing-
ham of New York). In addition, Representative Stephen Solarz argued that the amendment
was unnecessary and potentially counterproductive. Id. at 11,442-43.
e Sen. Durkin's amendment read as follows:
Domestically Produced Crude Oil
Section 119. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act and notwith-
standing subsection (u) of section 28 of the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, no do-
mestically produced crude oil transported by pipeline over rights-of-way granted
pursuant to such section 28 (except any such crude oil which (1) is exchanged in
similar quantity for convenience or increased efficiency of transportation with per-
sons or the government of an adjacent foreign state, or (2) is temporarily exported
for convenience or increased efficiency of transportation across parts of an adja-
cent foreign state and reenters the United States) may be exported from the
United States, its territories and possessions.
123 CONG. REC. 13,783 (1977). The arguments made in support of the Durkin Amendment
were similar to those made in the House. See, e.g., id. at 13,783 (remarks of Senator John A.
Durkin of New Hampshire).
Senate opposition to the export ban stressed several factors: (1) a surplus of oil result-
ing from Alaskan production exists on the west coast; (2) transporting the oil to other parts
of the United States is very costly, while the costs of shipping the oil from Alaska to Japan
are low; and (3) the east coast can obtain oil from OPEC nations at a lesser cost than it can
from Alaska. Id. at 13,784 (remarks of Senator Adlai Stevenson of Illinois). For an explana-
tion supporting an exchange of oil with Japan, see id. at 13,786.
Id. at 13,787 (administration position reported to the Senate).
70 See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
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tion of approving a project which environmentalists contended would de-
stroy important and sensitive ecological systems in the wilderness areas of
Alaska. However, Congress passed the TAPS Act and reversed court or-
ders enjoining the construction of the pipeline.1 Ultimately, the Durkin
Amendment was defeated by a vote of 66 to 27,72 and the Export Admin-
istration Improvements and Extension Bill' s was passed shortly after-
wards by a vote of 90 to 1.74 Thus, the House bill and the Senate bill
differed significantly on the matter of prohibiting exportation of Alaskan
oil.
A conference was convened between members of both Houses of Con-
gress for the purpose of hammering out a compromise on the language in
disagreement. The result of the conference on the Export Administration
Act Amendments of 1977 was the adoption of the softened House lan-
guage,'7 5 which was ultimately approved by both the House and the
Senate.
The compromise agreed to by the conference committee was that
Alaskan oil could be exported, but only by way of a:
[V]ery elaborate procedure, whereby there must be a specific Presiden-
tial determination that the crude oil export: First, will not diminish the
total quantity or quality of petroleum available to the United States; sec-
ond, will have a positive effect on consumer oil prices by decreasing the
average crude oil acquisition costs of refiners; third, will be made only
pursuant to contracts which which may be terminated if the petroleum
supplies of the United States are interrupted or seriously threatened;
fourth, are in the national interest; and fifth, are in accordance with the
provisions of the Export Administration Act. Furthermore, the President
must report these findings to the Congress and the report cannot go
ahead until the expiration of a 60-day period, during which either House
of Congress can veto the proposed export.76
The significant portion of this language was the 60-day period within
which Congress would have the power to veto a Presidential effort to ex-
port Alaskan oil. By the time the Export Administration Act came up for
renewal again in 1979, it was clear to those who favored exportation of
71 Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 93-153, 87 Stat. 576, 584
(1973).
712 123 CONG. REC. 13,810 (1977). The defeat came on a vote to table the amendment,
which made the amendment moot once the bill itself was passed later in the day.
73H.R. 5840, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REc. 13,812 (1977).
71, The one nay vote was cast by Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina. Nine Senators
did not vote. See id.
75 CONF. REP. No. 354, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 404.
71 123 CONG. REc. 18,376 (1977) (statement of Rep. Zablocki presenting the conference
report to the House of Representatives).
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Alaskan oil to Japan that the provisions of the 1977 Act had, in fact,
made it extremely difficult to export that oil because the President would
have to find that such exports would "have a positive effect on consumer
oil prices."77
E. 1979 Amendments: The Prohibition is Made More Complete
The cap on Alaskan crude oil exportation was made more secure by
the amendments to the Export Administration Act in 1979, changing the
Congressional "veto" power to a Congressional "approval" power.7 8 As
with previous legislation concerning export controls, the existing political
climate was important to the considerations of the 1979 amendments .7
Concerns persisted in early 1979, when Congressional hearings were
being conducted on the Export Administration Act, over the potential of
Alaskan oil being exported to Japan. The AFL-CIO had an interest in the
export question because of the fact that if the oil was not exported, new
tankers, pipelines and refineries would be needed to handle the Alaskan
oil in this country, and that, if the oil was exported to Japan,
"[e]mployment in shipyards and the construction industry will be ex-
ported along with Alaska oil." 80 To assure that this would not happen, the
AFL-CIO urged the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Com-
mitee to provide in the new legislation that the Act "be changed to re-
quire a specific congressional approval before any proposed export of
Alaska oil is allowed."81
The issue of benefits to American consumers, introduced in the 1977
Amendments, was not so easily disposed of, as John O'Leary, then Dep-
uty Secretary of Energy made clear during the Senate Committee's ques-
tioning. In an exchange with Senator Adlai Stevenson, Chairman of the
Subcommittee on International Finance, Mr. O'Leary admitted that the
inability to show consumer benefits was the one issue which would pre-
vent the President from proposing a swap of Alaskan crude oil with Ja-
pan and Mexico.8 2
77 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
78 Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2406(d) (Supp. V 1981).
79 In January 1979, Mohammed Reza Shah Pahlavi, the Shah of Iran, fled his country
and a provisional revolutionary government was established under the leadership of the
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. This change of government in Iran included a temporary cut
off of all oil exports from that country, thus reviving the concern over U.S. dependence on
foreign energy sources.
60 U.S. Export Control Policy and Extension of the Export Administration Act: Hear-
ings on S.737 and S.977 before the Subcommittee on International Finance of the Senate
Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 37 (1979) (state-
ment of Dr. Rudolph Oswald, Director, Research Department, AFL-CIO).
81 Id. at 33.
82 Mr. O'Leary stated:
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As before, the principal purposes of the 1979 amendments were to
protect national security, to support U.S. foreign policy, and to preserve
resources in short supply, not to prohibit the exportation of Alaskan oil.
In fact, in 1979 the major concern of Congress was to protect the domes-
tic economy from the excessive drain of scarce materials and the reduc-
tion of serious inflationary impacts caused by foreign demand. 3
Thus, the Senate committee supported the view that a possible infla-
tionary impact caused by oil exports should be a sufficient condition for
the implementation of controls in short supply situations. The converse
would also seem worthy of support; exports which would improve eco-
nomic conditions, such as a reduction in the balance of payments, should
be a sufficient condition to warrant the listing of controls. However, even
though the Carter administration argued that exporting Alaskan crude oil
to Japan would have this result, the Senate passed an amendment to
strengthen the prohibition on exporting Alaskan crude oil.'
There is an additional point, Mr. Chairman. There is a requirement under the
provisions of section 4(I)'[of thit jiof'Admiinistration Act] that the President
find that benefits will flow to consumers.
It's unlikely, under the sort of contract that I put before you, that the con-
sumer will, in fact, benefit in direct ways.
Now, please understand me, I'm not pleading the case for higher net backs to
producers on the North Slope because I like to see oil companies get more money.
I'm pleading the case because there's a direct link between their price expecta-
tions and the amount they are willing to invest.
And I think its absolutely imperative that over the next dozen years or there-
abouts that we make a major, indeed, a massive exploration effort in Alaska.
I think that will not be forthcoming unless the attitude, the price attitude or
atmosphere, is as beneficial as we can make it.
These benefits will not go in the short run to the consumers. Ultimately, if
producers are successful in finding additional supplies of oil, quite clearly the con-
sumer will benefit. I'm not sure the President can make the literal findings that
are required by the section as it reads now and probably he could well be subject
to a challenge if he attempted to do so.
SENATOR STEVENSON. Is that the only finding that the president would have
difficulty making, a finding with respect to a positive effect on consumer oil prices
by decreasing the average crude oil acquisition cost to refiners?
MR. O'LEARY. That's the one that we would regard as virtually impossible to
make in the real world.
Id. at 152-53.
83 S. REP. No. 169, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE CONG. &
An. NEws 1147, 1150.
" See, e.g., 125 CONG. REc. S10,184 (daily ed. July 21, 1979) (statement of Senator
Durkin); id. at S10,187-88 (statement of Senator Proxmire). The House was also insistent on
strengthening the export ban. See 125 CONG. REC. H8472 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1979).
The only exceptions permitted by either House of Congress involved the Camp David
agreement between Israel and Egypt in which the United States agreed to supply oil to
Israel under specified conditions for 15 years. This exception affected Senate ratification of
U.S. involvement in that treaty.
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In 1979, when the Senate and House went to conference on the Ex-
port Administration Act Amendments, little compromise was necessary.
The Conference Report summarized the issue of the export of Alaskan oil
succinctly:
The Senate bill permitted the export of oil after a period of 60 calen-
dar days of congressional session unless both Houses of Congress adopt a
concurrent resolution of disapproval.
The House amendment would permit the export of oil only if Con-
gress passes a concurrent resolution approving such export within 60
days.
The committee of conference agreed to the House provision."
President Carter signed the Export Administration Act into law on Sep-
tember 29, 1979. The Act was reauthorized and extended on December
29, 1981.86 Thus, the legislative history demonstrates how the political re-
alities of constituent pressures operated to prevent legislation intended to
encourage economic efficiency and to promote the nation's welfare.
Ill. JAPAN's DEPENDENCE ON IMPORTED OIL
Japan, a small island nation with a population roughly half that of
the United States, has the world's third largest gross domestic product
(GDP).8 7 As an island nation, Japan imports many natural resources and
exports finished goods to maintain its highly successful economy.
Japan imports 84.1 percent of its energy needs.s8 No other major in-
dustrial power is as dependent upon imported energy.89 For example, by
comparison the United States imports only -18.6 percent of energy con-
sumedY° Oil is the primary source of energy in Japan accounting for 66.4
percent of energy consumed."" Japan is 99.8 percent dependent upon im-
35 CoNF. REP. No. 482, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 50-51 (1979), reprinted in 1979 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1180, 1188 (emphasis added). For a complete discussion of the legislative
veto, see supra note 50. A concurrent resolution of approval may well constitute a legislative
veto within the meaning of Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha.
" Export Administration Amendments Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-145, 95 Stat. 1727
(1981).
87 OFFICE op JAPANESE AFFAIRS, BUREAU OF EAST AsIAN AND PAcIc AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE (statement of Michael ichalak, Country Officer).
PETLROLEuM DEP'T, AGENCY OFATtm cgo s AD ENERGY, MINISTRY OF INTER-
NATIONAL TRADE AND INDUSTRY, THE PETROLEUM REPORT-THE RECENT PETROLEUM SrruA-
TIoN AND JAPAN's PETRoLEUM PoucIEs 2 (Nov. 1982) [hereinafter cited as PETRoLEuM
REPORT].
89 AGENCY op NATURAL RESoURcES AND ENERGY, MINISTRY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND
INDUSTRY, ENERGY IN JAPAN: FACTS AND FIGURES 6 (May 1982) [hereinafter cited as ENERGY
IN JAPAN].
90 Id.
9' PETROLEUM REPORT, supra note 88, at 2.
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ported oil.92 This compares with an 11.1 percent dependence on imported
oil for the United States.93
The conventional wisdom in the United States is to view Japan as an
industrial behemoth whose export policies are responsible for many of our
economic and social ills. The facts indicate, however, that in spite of Ja-
pan's efficiency in industrial mass production, its economy is fragile and
precariously dependent upon imported energy. Japan's efficient use of en-
ergy reflects its national concern for this problem as well as national pri-
orities." Japan's extraordinary dependence on foreign energy necessarily
becomes a focal point of foreign policy. Sixty-nine percent of Japan's oil
comes from the Middle East.9 5 National leaders of the Middle Eastern
countries are quite aware of Japan's dependency upon their oil.
The United States and Japan enjoy a unique bilateral relationship, a
relationship that many Americans believe benefits Japan far more than
this country. From an economic perspective, the United States is Japan's
largest export market.9 Additionally, since the Second World War, either
as a matter of U.S. foreign policy, or of Japan's own volition, Japan has
not maintained a conventional armed force. Japan's entire strategic de-
fense umbrella has been maintained by the United States.
The possible divergence between U.S. political interests and Japan's
economic interests in maintaining a continuous supply of imported en-
ergy is a frightening prospect for Japanese foreign policy makers. This
can be no better exemplified than through the schism that developed be-
tween the United States and Japan during the Iranian hostage crisis. The
failure of the government of Japan and its nationals to honor U.S. re-
quests for sanctions against the government of Iran after that government
condoned the seizure of the American Embassy in Tehran provides ample
proof that: (1) Middle East oil can be used to pressure Japan politically;
(2) Japan is highly vulnerable to economic pressures from its foreign oil
suppliers; and (3) the U.S. national security network can easily break
down, to the extent that its Japanese alliance is neutralized.9 7
2 d.
' ENERGY IN JAPAN, supra note 89, at 6.
94 For example, the industrial sector uses 57.9 percent of all energy consumed in Japan.
By comparison, U.S. industry consumes only 36.8 percent of the total U.S. energy supply.
Id. at 8.
95 Id. at 20.
" In 1980, Japan exported $30.7 billion in product to the United States. U.S. BUREAU
OF CENSUS, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND NAVIGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, HIGHLIGHT OF U.S.
EXPORT AND IMPORT TRADE (1980). The trade deficit between the two nations was $10.4
million in favor of Japan. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY
OF CURRENT BUSINESS 50 (June 1981).
97 For a review of the effect of the Iranian hostage crisis on U.S.-Japanese relations, see
N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1979, at A18, col. 1; Washington Post, Dec. 14, 1979, at A18; Washing-
ton Post, Dec. 13, 1979, at A26; N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1979, at A18, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Dec.
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Unlike the confrontation with the United States during the Iranian
hostage crisis, Japan's dependence on foreign sources of oil usually
manifests itself in far less dramatic elements of its foreign policy. In 1979
for example, then Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira hosted an economic
summit of the seven leading industrial democracies. At that meeting Mr.
Ohira, in an effort to curry favor with Japan's Middle Eastern oil suppli-
ers, proposed a joint declaration calling for recognition and respect for
the rights of Palestinians.9 It was reported that the President of France,
Valery Giscard d'Estaing, opposed the declaration believing that it was
inappropriate for an economic summit to make a political statement.99
Mr. Ohira's proposal was defeated, probably by the arrival of news that
OPEC had just voted a major .price increase. 100
Japan's dependence on foreign oil shaped not only Mr. Ohira's objec-
tives at the summit but isolated Japan from the rest of the participants in
the framing of a response to OPEC's price increase. 101 Mr. Ohira was the
only head of state at the conference who objected to a resolution criticiz-
ing OPEC for its price increase. 10 2 The resolution stated: "[W]e deplore
the recent decisions taken by the OPEC conference." 03 Mr. Ohira report-
edly found the word "deplore" too strong, not wishing to offend OPEC oil
suppliers.' 0" Clearly the availability of oil, and not price, was Japan's ma-
jor concern in 1979.105
As an island nation, Japan has historically been concerned with re-
source conservation. In October 1979, Japan enacted the Law Concerning
the Rationalization in the Use of Energy.106 The Act provides "a standard
for rationalization of [the] use of energy for factories, buildings, home
electric appliances, and automobiles.' 0 7 Like the United States, Japan
provides financial and tax incentives for investment in energy-saving fa-
cilities as well as "guidance and assistance to medium and small enter-
prises." 08 Through the Moon Light Project, the government of Japan
funds the research and development of "[l]arge-scale energy conservation
technology as well as that of leading and basic technology."' 09
11, 1979, at Al, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1979, at D13, col. 1.
9s N.Y. Times, July 8, 1979, at E4, col. 1.
"Id.
200 Id.
101 Id.
22 Id.
108 Id.
104 Id.
105 For a summary of Japanese energy policies, see ENERGY IN JAPAN, supra note 89, at
15.
100 Id. at 16.
107 Id.
108 Id.
109 ENERGY IN JAPAN, supra note 89, at 16.
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Measured as a percentage of change, with 100 percent being the stan-
dard, Japanese domestic petroleum consumption from the period 1975
through 1979 was as follows:110
1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981
96.9 107.2 100.6 102.5 99.2 89.7 93.1
Preliminary data for 1982 indicates that crude oil imports will be only 92
percent of 1981 levels while the Japanese economy sustained a projected
growth rate of 3.7 percent." I
The government of Japan credits its conservation efforts and the
technological advances achieved through the Moon Light Project for
making Japan one of the most energy efficient countries in the world." 2
Of the major industrial powers, Japan has the lowest per capita consump-
tion of energy."13
Japan has equally ambitious plans for its alternative energy pro-
grams. In May 1980, Japan implemented the Law Concerning the Promo-
tion of Development and Introduction of Petroleum Substituting En-
ergy.1 4 By October 1980, the government had established the New
Energy Development Organization."15 Japan spent 158 billion yen in fiscal
year (FY) 1981 and an estimated 166 billion yen in FY 1982 in further-
ance of its alternative energy policies." 6 On April 30, 1982 the govern-
ment of Japan announced the official Supply Target for Alternative En-
ergy to be 51 percent of all energy consumed in Japan in 1990."1 The
alternative energies to be utilized are "coal, nuclear power, [liquified] nat-
ural gas (LNG), hydro-power, geothermal energy, solar energy and other
alternative energy sources.""l 8 Of these, coal, nuclear and LNG will ac-
count for the bulk of increased alternative energy production.1 9
Japan relies on coal as a major alternative source of energy for elec-
trical power generation and for industrial applications. There presently
exists a moratorium of new oil fired power plants with the exception of
those plants already under construction. 20 Conversion of plants from oil
to coal firing is encouraged. In addition to the use of steam coal as fuel,
110 PETROLEUM REPORT supra note 88, at 16 app., table 7.
11 Id. at 2.
112 ENERGY IN JAPAN, supra note 89, at 16.
113 Id. at 17.
114 Id. at 18.
12 This organization serves as a center for the promotion of new energy development.
Id. ,
I l e I d .
117 Id.
I's Id.
119 Id. at 19.
120 Id. at 24.
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Japan is also conducting research into the more exotic coal technologies
such as coal-oil mixtures. 121
The increased demand for steam coal will be met by imports from
Australia, China, the contiguous portion of the United States or the State
of Alaska, as Japanese coal production is expected to remain constant.
122
Of particular interest to Japan and the State of Alaska is the develop-
ment of the Beluga coal field.123 In addition, the Japanese government
"places its greatest expectations on nuclear energy as the alternative en-
ergy source for the future.
'124
The last of the three major alternative energy sources, LNG, pres-
ently accounts for six percent of Japan's energy consumption.12 5 In 1979
"special contract rates" went into effect which the United States designed
to increase LNG consumption. 126 Japan hopes to increase demand to the
extent that LNG will account for 11.5 percent of Japan's domestic supply
by 1990.12 7 Since the mid-1960's, the Kenai gas fields of Alaska have been
supplying LNG to Japan.1
26
The final goal of Japanese domestic energy policy is to secure stable
oil supplies by decreasing Japan's dependence on Middle Eastern oil. The
trilateral trade of petroleum between Alaska, Japan and Mexico is the
ideal solution to Japan's energy policy goals.
Despite Japan's extraordinary efforts in the field of energy conserva-
tion and alternative energy production, it is inconceivable that petroleum
will cease to be a major source of energy for Japan. Japanese projections
show petroleum providing for 49.1 percent of Japan's energy needs in
1990 and 38 percent of its needs in 2000.20 It is imperative as a matter of
121 Id. at 5.
122 Id. at 24.
12' The Beluga coal field is located in the Cook Inlet of South Central Alaska and is
closer to Japan than the remaining free world fields located in Australia. The relatively low
BTU content per ton of coal makes coal highly transportation cost sensitive.
12' See ENERGY IN JAPAN, supra note 89, at 22.
125 Id. at 26.
126 Id.
127 Id.
I2 N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1983, at D1. In addition, the oil fields of Prudhoe Bay, Alaska
contain vast reserves of natural gas. However, no gas pipeline has been built to transport the
product to market. An overland pipeline to extend from Alaska across Canada into the mid-
western United States was suggested by President Carter in 1977, but for a variety of politi-
cal and financial reasons, the project has not gone forward. In January, 1983, a Committee,
chaired by two former Alaskan Governors, recommended that a gas line be built linking
Prudhoe Bay to a liquification facility in South Central Alaska. An additional recommenda-
tion that the LNG be exported to Japan was based on the strong and increasing demand for
LNG in Japan and the geographic proximity of Alaska to the Japanese market. GovERNOR's
ECONOMIC COMMrr , STATE OF ALAsKA, TRANs-AAsKA GAS SYSTEM ECONOMICS OF AN AL-
TERNATIrVE FOR NORTH SLOPE GAS (1983).
1'1 PEToELEum REPORT, supra note 88, at 3 app., table 1.
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public policy, for both Japan and the United States, that Japan acquire
politically secure sources of petroleum."' 0
Obtaining secure sources of petroleum is a difficult, long-term project
for Japan. The Middle East remains the principal source of supply of
Japan.1 3' Recently, Japan has secured oil from other sources such as Mex-
ico and China. 32 Although this represents only a small percentage of Ja-
pan's total import requirements, Japan's overall reductions in the use of
petroleum have been made at the expense of Middle Eastern sources"3
resulting in a decline in the number of barrels per day of imports from
that region.' 3
In the oil industry, worldwide petroleum operations are divided into
the exploration, production and refining components (upstream) and the
marketing and distribution functions (downstream). Japan's oil industry
is structurally weak in that it lacks significant upstream capability. 3"
Only 6.8 percent of Japan's imported petroleum comes from overseas
work conducted by Japanese oil exploration companies."31 Japanese ex-
ploration companies have retained a progressively smaller share of the
Japanese imported oil market. 37 This substantially complicates Japan's
efforts to obtain secure oil sources. To combat this problem the govern-
ment-owned Japan National Oil Corporation heavily subsidizes the oper-
ations of Japanese exploration companies.'3 8
Though Japan as a nation may be weak in the field of oil exploration,
Japanese trading companies enjoy a much deserved worldwide reputation
for their astuteness. Japanese trading companies are actively seeking per-
mission to buy Alaskan crude oil, albeit on a bilateral rather than trilat-
eral basis. The purchase of Alaskan crude has many advantages for Ja-
pan. The most obvious advantage is that Alaska is a politically stable and
secure source of petroleum. The enormous throughput of the Trans-
Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) makes the prospect even more appealing
to the Japanese.
TAPS is presently producing 1.6 million barrels per day. 39 The U.S.
Department of Energy (DOE) estimates that as many as 594,000 barrels
per day could be exported to Japan if export controls were lifted. 14 0 In
130 This is acknowledged by the Japanese government. See id. at 7.
"I' Id. at 8 app., fig. 4.
132 Id. at 3.
133 This can be inferred from the data in figure 4 and table 9. Id. at 8, 18 app.
134 Id. at 8 app., fig. 4.
135 Id. at 12.
"I Id. at 10 app., fig. 5.
157 Id.
133 Id. at 20.
139 M. Hoyler, The Alaskan Exports Issue (Dec. 1982) (unpublished manuscript).
"140 D. Lindahl, Exports of Alaskan Crude Oil 1 (Dec. 4, 1981) (memorandum published
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December 1982 this estimate was increased to 800,000 barrels per day""1
by Marshall Hoyler of the Logistics Management Institute, who as a for-
mer DOE employee had calculated the previous DOE estimate. Thus, Ja-
pan, which presently imports 2,749,000 barrels per day from the Middle
East could reduce its dependence on Middle Eastern crude oil by as much
as 29 percent.142 The resulting reduction would make the United States
Japan's second largest supplier of oil.143
Acquisition of Alaskan crude could also affect the way Japan con-
ducts its entire Middle East policy. The probability that Japan could be
held as an economic hostage, as the Ayatollah Khomeini attempted with
the completion of a petrochemical complex at less than favorable terms,
would be substantially diminished. Japan's negotiating posture with all
OPEC members would be enhanced. Japan would also be less susceptible
to political blackmail by its oil suppliers. Ayatollah Khomeini's so-called
"allegiance test," which forced Japanese companies to buy crude oil at
above market prices during the Iranian hostage crisis, is the best example
of the potential result of political blackmail against Japan.
Japan's acquisition of Alaskan crude oil also diminishes the possibil-
ity of a divergence between U.S. political interests in the Middle East and
Japan's economic interest in maintaining a continuous supply of Middle
Eastern oil, such as that which arose during the Iranian hostage crisis.
A significant non-oil related benefit from the export of Alaskan crude
oil to Japan is a substantial lowering of Japan's trade surplus with the
United States. It may well be that current inquires by the government of
Japan regarding the availability of Alaskan crude for export have been
more strongly motivated by the politics of Japanese-U.S. trade negotia-
tions than by energy security.
For the last several years, the growing U.S. trade deficit with Japan
has been the subject of increased concern in this country.1" This has
by the Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress).
141 Interview with Marshall Hoyler, Research fellow with the Logistics Management In-
stitute, in Washington, D.C. (Feb. 1983).
'42 This is calculated by dividing Japan's present imports of Middle Eastern crude
(2,749,000 barrels/day) into the potential volume of imports from Alaska (800,000 barrels/
day).d 43 Saudi Arabia, Japan's largest oil supplier, provided Japan with 35.3 percent of its oil
needs in FY 1981. PETROLEUM REPORT, supra note 88, at 8 app., fig. 4. Indonesia, who sup-
plied 15.8 percent of Japan's oil requirements during the same period, ranks third. Id.
144 See BuREAu OF ECONOmc ANALYsIS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERcE, SURVEY OF CURRENT
BusiNEss 50 (June 1981). These figures reflect the adjusted balance of payment excluding
military sales and event expenditures.
U.S. markets are for the most part freely open to imported Japanese goods. Japanese
markets, on the other hand, are believed to be largely closed to U.S. imports. Public aware-
ness of the U.S./Japan trade issue has recently increased given the decline of the automobile
industry due in part to the penetration of Japanese automobiles into the U.S. market. How-
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been a source of friction between the two countries and negotiations of
substantial economic and political significance to both parties have been
ongoing. As the trade deficit between the two nations has grown and pub-
lic sentiment in the United States heightened in its call for demonstrative
action, the Office of the Special Trade Representative has intensified its
efforts, repeatedly pointing to the widening trade deficit between the two
nations.
In 1982 Japanese negotiators realized that one reason the deficit be-
tween the United States and Japan was so high was that export restric-
tions were placed on Alaskan crude oil. If Japan could buy up to 800,000
barrels per day of Alaskan crude oil, the trade deficit between Japan and
the United States would be reduced by $7.3 billion per annum.1" Often,
when Japanese negotiators are reminded of Japan's tariff and non-tariff
import barriers they rightfully respond by pointing at U.S. export
controls.
Whether for reasons of energy policy, or trade negotiations, or both,
the government of Japan is quite interested in purchasing Alaskan crude
oil. In January of 1983, during Prime Minister Nakasone's visit with Pres-
ident Reagan, the two heads of state exchanged views on a variety of is-
sues. President Reagan asked that Japan increase its defense budget and
Prime Minister Nakasone asked President Reagan, among other things,
to consider exporting Alaskan crude to Japan.146 As a result of that re-
quest, President Reagan has ordered a Cabinet level working group to
review export controls of Alaskan oil.147
IV. MExICo: AN OIL RICH NATION ON THE VERGE OF BANKRUPTCY
Throughout 1980 and 1981, banks around the world were lining up to
lend money to fuel Mexico's oil based economic boom. By late July 1982,
Mexican government officials were scurrying around to many of the same
banks searching for emergency cash to maintain their national solvency.
Most experts agree that this dramatic change in Mexico's finances was
due, ironically, to the same forces of development that were made possi-
ble by the momentum of the oil boom. The collapse of the worldwide oil
market in 1981 was not met with a concomitant temperance of the eco-
nomic growth policies of the economic planners.
In a recent state of the nation address, then-President Jose Lopez
ever, the major U.S. negotiating efforts have been to reduce Japanese trade barriers on agri-
cultural products strongly lobbied for by the Japanese agricultural industry.
145 This figure was determined by multiplying the throughput to Japan by the well-
head price at the time the article was written.
148 Interview with Lennie Boston, Special Staff Assistant to Governor Bill Sheffield of
Alaska (Jan. 1983).
147 Id.
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Portillo14 s defended the policies which led to Mexico's $80 billion national
debt. Portillo pointed out that the lending banks relied on Mexico's oil
wealth to secure these loans 149 and that the economic growth of the type
experienced by Mexico since 1976 had to be taken to the limit to insure
the attainment of certain economic growth levels.150
The economic development policies of Jose Lopez Portillo's Adminis-
tration grew out of the 1976 discovery of enormous oil fields in the south-
eastern part of Mexico. By mid-1980 the potential reserves were esti-
mated at 250 billion barrels. 15 Between 1976 and 1981 production of
crude oil increased by 190 percent. 52 The production development plan
was an ambitious one, but even so, in many respects actual production
surpassed the estimates of the planners. For instance, in the second half
of 1981, 18 months ahead of schedule, production reached 2.75 million
barrels per day, thrusting Mexico into the number four position among
world oil producers."5 '
The development of the industry envisioned the maintenance of ex-
ports at 1.5 million barrels daily.'54 This was based on the underlying the-
ory that oil exports would serve to offset the imports required for the
future industrialization of Mexico. The plan was to use oil production to
secure the future economic well-being of the country. 55
Another by-product of Mexico's new economy was its role as a
respected member of the developing world. Recently, Mexico presented a
World Energy Plan to the United Nations.' This plan was predicated on
the theory that energy sources should be used for the benefit of all na-
tions, not just a privileged few.15 7 In an arrangement with Venezuela and
in an attempt to implement this policy, the two countries supplied Cen-
tral America and the Caribbean countries with petroleum under very
favorable financial terms. This plan has placed Mexico in a leadership
role among developing nations. In recent years Mexico has taken the view
that in order to affect the international forces which bear on Mexico's
148 Mexico has a one party system. The President serves a single term of six years.
149 BANCO NACIONAL DE MEXICO, VOL. LVIH, No. 681/682, REVIEW OF THE EcONOMIc
SITUATION OF MEXICO 295-313 (Aug./Sept. 1982) [hereinafter cited as ECONOMIc REVIEW OF
MEXICO].
250 Id.
"' INSTITUTO MEXICANO DE COMERCIO EXTERIOR, MEXICO 82, at 15 (1982) [hereinafter
cited as MEXICO 82].
152 Id. at 15-16.
"I Id. at 16.
2" Id.
15 In 1980, the sale of hydrocarbons represented 64.5% of all Mexican exports. Total
exports rose from $15.3 billion in 1980 to $19.6 billion in 1981. However, imports rose to
$23.3 billion translating into a $3.7 billion balance of trade deficit in 1981. Id. at 26.
166 ECONoImic REVIEW OF MEXICO, supra note 149, at 255.
157 Id.
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internal well-being, the country must take an active role in international
matters. It was a Mexican initiative that brought twenty-two heads of
state together at the Cancfn Meeting. 58 In 1980 and 1981 Mexico effec-
tively carried out its duties on the United Nations Security Council. 59 Its
participation was heralded by many as an ideal mix of independence and
reason which promoted just causes and supported principles rather than
countries. Mexico has been able to exercise its leadership in the Carib-
bean Basin in a similar spirit. Its leadership has acted as a buffer between
the forces of social reform and the adverse interests of the United States.
The new role of Mexico in the international community has gradually
come to be accepted by the United States. Increasingly, the United States
has sought the intervention of Mexico in matters not strictly bilateral. At
the United Nations, Mexico was found to be indispensable in dealing with
the problems of Central America and the Caribbean countries as well as
with the Falklands conflict.160 In all matters relating to global negotia-
tions, Mexico has dealt with the major powers along lines of mutual
respect.
For Mexico, the economic growth which stems from its new posture
as an oil producing nation represents the opportunity .o effectuate some
fundamental social changes which until now had given rise to much rhet-
oric and nothing more. The oil-based economic growth has enabled Mex-
ico to promote agricultural development and to begin to become self-suffi-
cient in food production. 11
In the past six years, Mexican officials have continually attempted to
minimize the importance of oil in the economy. In fact, oil is viewed as
the means of transforming an economy based on a non-renewable re-
source into an industrial base of renewable resources providing future ec-
onomic security for the country.
The world oil glut which commenced in 1981 presented the Mexican
government with a choice of: (1) continuing one of the most dramatic and
ambitious development plans of modern times; or (2) cutting back eco-
nomic development in a manner reflecting world economic realities. Per-
haps influenced by the developing countries' traditional mistrust of the
158 Id.
'o Id. at 256.
180 Id. at 261.
'6 For example, in 1980, the Mexican President proposed the Mexican Food System,
and the Congress approved massive agricultural development programs. These programs
were designed to promote Mexican self-sufficiency in the production of corn, beans, rice and
wheat. During the 1981-82 harvest season, Mexico's wheat crop reached an unprecedented
level of 4.3 million tons, and the corn, bean and rice crops increased by 19, 51 and 41 per-
cent respectively. In addition, farmland increased by 3,350,000 hectares further enabling
Mexico to progress toward self-sufficiency in food production. Id. at 278. This agricultural
development illustrates the social effects of the oil-based economic growth in Mexico.
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motives of international financial institutions, Mexican officials opted to
prolong the country's debt status to whatever extent the creditors would
allow. 1 62 This was done in the hopes of not interrupting the oil boom; it
was an attempt to bridge the oil glut. Money was borrowed to stimulate
continued economic growth, decrease unemployment and keep down the
cost of living.6 3 The result was an $80 billion foreign debt. 6 4
If Mexico can overcome the present stagnation in the world oil mar-
ket, it has the means and resources to continue its development program.
Recognizing this, shortly after the devaluation of the peso in August 1982,
the U.S. government increased its petroleum purchases from Mexico for
the U.S. Strategic Petroleum Reserve. 165 The increase represented nearly
a quadrupling of purchases from 50,000 barrels a day to 190,000 over the
next year. 66 Facing the realities of its need for hard cash the Mexican
government eliminated its limits on oil production as an unaffordable
luxury.
The fortunate side of the Mexican economic situation at this point is
that the public investments made with income in foreign exchange and
through indebtedness are a permanent part of the national assets. These
assets represent the solution to the present crisis; the production of oil is
the key to the country's recovery. As Mexico enters an era of economic
reconstruction under new leadership, it will be searching for ways to im-
plement several economic recovery measures based on its production of
oil.
In terms of economic efficiency, the best opportunity available to
Mexico to provide for a steady flow of foreign exchange income for its
development plan is to supply oil to the eastern United States and dis-
place Alaskan oil which could then be diverted to Japan. The advantages
to Mexico of such an arrangement include: (1) a secure market for the
sale of oil at a time when the world oil glut is expected to continue; and
162 Washington Post, Aug. 29, 1982, at Al, col. 1.
'63 For example, massive building projects continued in expectation of rising oil reve-
nues. The government also helped to pay for selected consumer goods by subsidizing prod-
ucts ranging from tortillas (a $1.4 billion subsidy) to petroleum products (a subsidy esti-
mated at 6 percent of the gross domestic product). Id.
' Id. These short-term measures were soon overextended given the weakening oil
prices and the deepening world recession. Inflation in Mexico had reached 30 percent by
1981. Id. at A14, col. 1. This increase in contrast with a decreasing inflation rate in the
United States caused a rapid deterioration of the balance of payments. These circumstances
along with the devaluation of the peso provoked the transfer of capital from Mexico to the
United States. This outflow continued even though the government implemented several
austerity programs. As bankers began to refuse to renew short-term government loans, the
Mexican government closed its exchange markets to stop the outflow of capital and began to
look to international banks for assistance. Id.
165 Wall St. J., Aug. 20, 1982, at 24.
166 Id.
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(2) increased well-head prices resulting from reduced transportation costs
due to the proximity and size of the eastern U.S. market, and the devel-
opment of two new industrial parks on the Gulf of Mexico which are to
be the future centers of heavy industry, including primary petro-chemical
complexes which are ideally suited for the exportation of oil to the east-
ern United States at least cost.
These logistical advantages maximize the net return to Mexico on a
per barrel of throughput basis. Mexico's revenues, as with other owners of
oil, are dependent on the well-head price. The well-head price is the fair
market value of the oil at port of landing less transportation costs. Deliv-
ery of Mexican oil to the U.S. Gulf of Mexico and east coast ports repre-
sents a short haul, low transportation cost delivery which will maximize
revenues per barrel to Mexico.10 7
Throughout its history, Mexico has had an aversion to dependence
on the United States. In the context of Mexico's increased prominence in
world affairs and its present need to revive its oil sales, the historical
fears can now give way to a strong trade connection with the United
States.
Another major benefit to be derived from selling oil to the eastern
United States is the favorable impact that such trade would have on
Mexico's $3.7 billion trade deficit.'s As we have seen, the industrializa-
tion of the Mexican economy is dependent on its continued ability to off-
set the cost of importation of industrial machinery with revenues result-
ing from the export of oil.
By securing this market, Mexico will also reestablish itself as an im-
portant oil power. Mexico has proved itself to be independent of U.S.
influence in world affairs, but the security of the hemisphere has been
and will continue to be a common concern. Regardless of the ideological
differences between the countries, Mexico's resurgence as an oil power is
a goal which allows it the leverage necessary to maintain its leadership
role among developing nations. Its eventual ability to assist other nations
in the Caribbean Basin will enhance the principles of cooperation among
developing nations. Within this context, it should be noted that this goal
parallels the Caribbean Basin Initiative announced by the Reagan
Administration.6 9
Mexico has always been a prominent member of the Latin American
community. The dynamics of leadership among Latin American coun-
tries, as well as in other groups of developing nations, dictate that a coun-
try cannot maintain a leadership role unless it can demonstrate its ability
167 The Library of Congress estimates the total net back to be shared by all parties to
the trilateral trade to be $3.50 per barrel. D. Lindahl, supra note 140, at 2.
I" MExico 82, supra note 151, at 26.
169 18 WEEKLY Corn'. PRES. Doc. 217 (Mar. 1, 1982).
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to emerge from underdevelopment. Such is the message which Mexico
would send by establishment of a strong trade relationship with the
United States. The final and perhaps most important reason for Mexico's
participation in the U.S. oil market is that by trading with the United
States on such a scale Mexico would receive hard currency. The flight of
capital from Mexico was the major cause of the problems experienced by
that country in the summer of 1982.170 The hard currency from the oil
trade is a possible remedy which may be a step towards recovery. In addi-
tion, currency flow will put in place the machinery to continue those vi-
tally needed development projects which will insure the nation's contin-
ued economic survival irrespective of the depletion of its nonrenewable
resources. In short, it will make possible the implementation of its social
policies at home and abroad.
The solution to Mexico's economic problems, then, lies in the estab-
lishment of a strong oil trade. This trade should include a secure market
which geographically would afford Mexico the opportunity to maximize
revenues through low transportation costs. By establishing such a trade
with the United States Mexico's trade deficit would be reduced and, thus,
Mexico would possess greater bargaining power in its dealings with the
United States. Moreover, Mexico's economy would receive the much
needed hard currency. The currency flow from this trade would allow for
the reestablishment of Mexico's development programs. The security of a
neighboring market would give Mexico's development the type of con-
tinuity necessary for success. Mexico could then take part in the forma-
tion of international policy and regional development, a role which could
also be of great benefit to the United States.
V. THE UNITED STATES: OPTIMAL USE OF OIL RESOURCES
The proposed trilateral trade for crude oil is designed to use Alaska's
proximity to Japan and Mexico' proximity to the east coast of the United
States to optimize transportation efficiency in the delivery of oil from the
well-head to consumer markets.
Alaska comprises one-fifth of the land mass of the United States and
over sixty percent of its coastline. Surrounding the northern portion of
the Pacific Ocean, a group of land masses and islands in close proximity
to each other make up what is commonly called the Pacific Rim. They are
Japan, Korea, Taiwan, China and Alaska. A quick calculation shows that
on great circle routes Tokyo is about as far away from Anchorage as Chi-
cago is from Anchorage.'
170 Washington Post, Aug. 29, 1982, at Al, col. 1.
"7 Even though Tokyo and Chicago are equal distances from Anchorage, the Pacific
Ocean allows more convenient and economical trade between Anchorage and Tokyo as the
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Japan and Alaska have developed a very special trade relationship
which results from the Japanese need to import resources, Alaska's need
to export resources, the geographic proximity of the two entities, and the
convenience of waterborne transportation over the Pacific. The two gov-
ernments recognize and cultivate this relationship. The Foreign Ministry
of Japan posts a Counsul General in Anchorage, a city with a population
of only 250,000 people, and Alaska was the first and is still one of the few
states in the Union to maintain a fully staffed trade office in Tokyo.
172
Since the close of the Second World War, Alaska has sold an increas-
ing percentage of its natural resources to Japan. Japan is presently
Alaska's major market for fish, timber, liquified natural gas (LNG) and
urea ammonia fertilizer. 7 3 Japanese companies have made major invest-
ments in the Alaskan timber and fishing industries. Alaska hopes to ex-
pand trade to include coal.' 7' The demand for coal in Japan has caused
some Japanese companies to consider investing in the development of
Alaska's coal resources.
Whenever a government chooses to have the economic activities of its
nationals conducted in a controlled rather than in a free market economy
there necessarily results inefficiencies that can be measured in dollars and
cents. Export controls on the throughput of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline
System (TAPS) cause inefficiencies in shipping by effectively forcing oil
to be shipped either through the Panama Canal, Trans-Panama Pipeline
or around South America to the East Coast of the United States, rather
than to Japan. In the instant case, the victims of the cost of government
imposed inefficiencies are the Treasury of the United States, the Treasury
of the State of Alaska and the producers who own the TAPS crude.
7 5
Each dollar of revenue resulting from the sale of TAPS crude, mea-
sured at Valdez (the southern terminus of the system), is apportioned
between the U.S. government, the State of Alaska and the producers in
cargo can be transported entirely by ship from one city to the other. However, trade be-
tween Anchorage and Chicago or any inland U.S. city requires transfer of the goods to a
form of overland transportation after shipment to Seattle.
172 Statement of Kevin Coyner, Legislative Assistant to Senator Frank Murkowski
(1984) (formerly Assistant to the Director, Alaska State Asian Office, Tokyo, Japan). This
office was established in 1964 when U.S.-Japanese trade was virtually non-existent, thus
evidencing the long-standing relationship between Alaska and Japan.
173 DIVISION OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, STATE OF ALASKA,
ALASKA STATISTICAL REvmw, VOL. 1 (1982).
174 DEP'T OF COMMERCE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ALASKA STATE ASIAN OFFICE, Gov-
ERNMENT LEVEL DISCUSSION ON IMPORT OF ALASKAN OIL AND U.S. COAL (Apr. 11, 1982)
(translation); See also supra note 123 and accompanying text.
'75 See infra note 193 and accompanying text.
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accordance with Figure 1.176
Figure 1
Increased Netback Breakdown
Each dollar added to the Valdez price is split up between the State of
Alaska, the U.S. Treasury, and Alaskan producers as follows:
$0.125 Alaskan Royalty Oil
$0.1313 Alaskan Severance Tax
$0.0699 State Income Tax
$0.5206 U.S. Windfall Profits Tax
$0.0705 U.S. Corporate Income Tax
$0.0827 Producers' Profits
The U.S. government is by far the largest revenue earner, taking in 59.11
cents per dollar of oil sold.177 The State of Alaska ranks second at 32.62
cents collected for each dollar of oil sold.17 8 The producers earn the bal-
ance, 8.27 cents profit on the dollar. 79 Losses in revenue resulting from
transportation inefficiencies created by export controls are similarly
apportioned.
Persian Gulf crude is used as the pricing bench mark in the oil indus-
try. Oil produced from different fields around the world varies in quality
and, therefore, price. Using Persian Gulf oil as the quality and price stan-
dard, all other crudes are sold at a quality-adjusted Persian Gulf price
(PG). Similarly, the price of crude oil at a given consumer market is equal
to the PG plus the tanker rate per barrel from the Persian Gulf to the
consumer market. 80 The net back for a given barrel of TAPS oil is the
PG for TAPS oil, plus the cost of shipping a barrel of Persian Gulf oil to
the destination of the TAPS oil, less the cost of shipping the TAPS oil to
that destination.18 Using this formula we can calculate the net backs for
TAPS oil under export controlled and non-export controlled conditions.
The tanker rates necessary to perform the calculations appear in Figure
2.182
178 M. Hoyler, supra note 139, at 21.
177 Id.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 3 n.a.
181 Id. at 3. A producer's netback equals the price in a given market less transportation
costs from the well-head to that market.
182 Id. at 18.
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Figure 2
Assumptions Regarding Transportation Costs
SValdez
$0.51
Japan
$1.47 (current rate)
$1.05 (assumed rate if exports
were permitted)
U.S. West Coast
$0.96
$4.00
$1.50 U.S. Gulf Coast
$2.03
Persian Gulf
Under export controls an estimated 600,000 to 800,000 barrels per
day of TAPS oil, not consumed on the west coast of the United States,
are shipped through the Panama Canal or Trans-Panama Pipeline to the
Gulf of Mexico.188 If export controls were lifted that oil would be shipped
to Japan. Net back calculations for delivery to those markets are as
follows:' 4
Consumer Market
Gulf Coast U.S.
Japan
Price of Persian
Gulf Oil & Tanker
Rate Persian Gulf
to Market
PG + $2.03
PG + $0.96
Tanker Rate
Valdez to
- Market
- $4.00
- $0.51
Valdez
= Net Back
= PG - $1.97
= PG + $0.45
Thus, lifting of export controls would increase the net back $2.42 (i.e.,
$0.45 - (-$1.97)) per barrel.185
The balance of the TAPS throughput would be shipped to the west
coast of the United States. The net back from this oil would also change.
Under export control, west coast refiners know that net backs from ex-
181 Interview with Marshall Hoyler, supra note 141.
18 M. Hoyler, supra note 139, at 19.
181 Id.
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port-controlled oil shipped to the U.S. Gulf Coast (PG - $1.97) are lower
than net backs of oil shipped to their refineries (PG + $1.50 - $1.47 =
PG + $0.03).' The west coast refiners would like to share in that dif-
ference, thus increasing the profitability of their refineries. 8 7 An analysis
of 1981 data indicates that discounts were given to west coast refiners in
excess of $1.00 per barrel,'88 and in a fully competitive marketplace (i.e.,
the present world oil glut) transportation differentials indicate discounts
should be in excess of $2.00 per barrel. 8 Additionally, if export controls
are lifted, increased competition among U.S. flag tankers for the Valdez
to U.S. west coast trade would cause the tanker rate to decrease from
$1.47 to $1.05 per barrel. 90 The calculations for net back to the west
coast under export controlled and non-export controlled conditions are as
follows: 191
Price of Persian Gulf Tanker Rate
Oil & Tanker Rate Valdez Valdez
Persian Gulf to Market Discount to Market Net Back
Export Control PG + $1.50 - $2.00 - $1.47 = PG - $1.97
Non Export Control PG + $1.50 - $0.00 - $1.05 = PG + $0.45
The increase in net back is PG + $0.45 - (- $1.97) or $2.42 per barrel. 2
The net backs for Gulf Coast and west coast sales are the same under
export controlled conditions. The net backs for Japanese and west coast
sales under non-export controlled sales are also the same. This reflects
the state of affairs in a competitive marketplace.
These net backs per barrel calculations would result in an increased
revenue flow to the State of Alaska, both gross and net tax increases to
the federal government, and an increase in producer profits.193 The
United States, the State of Alaska and the producers will lose billions of
"8 Id.
'8 Id. at 6.
18 Id. at 20 (data provided by Petroleum Revenue Dep't, State of Alaska).
189 Interview with Marshall Hoyler, Research Fellow with the Logistics Management
Institute (Feb. 1984).
"' M. Hoyler, supra note 139, at 13, 18.
191 Id. at 19. These figures assume full discounting on the west coast. For a complete
discussion of this issue, see id. at 10.
192 Id. at 19.
193 For example, annual increased revenues resulting from decontrol (assuming dis-
counting on the west coast) were recently estimated as follows:
Gross Federal Net Federal Alaska State Producers
Taxes Taxes Taxes Profits
$980 million $595 million $461 million $564 million
M. Hoyler, supra note 139, at 9. An earlier study reached a similar though less dramatic
conclusion. D. Lindahl, supra note 140, at 2. The author believes the Hoyler estimates to be
more accurate as they are more recent.
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dollars over the life of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System as a result of
export controls. The effect of lifting export controls upon the price of oil
in the United States would be negligible. The foregoing calculations have
shown that Alaskan crude was selling on the Gulf Coast at a price equal
to the quality adjusted, and tanker rate compensated, Persian Gulf price.
Any oil sold in the Gulf of Mexico would be sold at that price. Implemen-
tation of the trilateral trade proposal would not affect the Gulf Coast
price. The disappearance of discounts for TAPS oil on the west coast
would cause refinery operations there to be less profitable. Consumer
prices would rise only to the extent that refiners could pass on their in-
creased costs. 194
Congress may lift export controls by either repealing section 7(d) of
the Export Administration Act in its entirety or by amending the section
to provide for trilateral trade involving Mexico. If export controls are re-
pealed, market forces would unquestionably, after an adjustment period,
cause all of the TAPS oil presently being shipped to the U.S. Gulf Coast
to flow to Japan. Gulf Coast refineries would purchase crude from other
fields, some undoubtedly from Mexico. Whereas, if controls are amended
to provide for trilateral trade, Mexico would be the sole supplier of oil.
This makes no difference to U.S. consumers since they will continue to
pay the Persian Gulf rate plus the Persian Gulf to Gulf of Mexico tanker
rates. The foreign policy benefits to the United States of a trilateral trade
arrangement, however, far outweigh those that would occur from a repeal
of section 7(d).
Although U.S. foreign policy objectives with Japan would be en-
hanced in either case, U.S. foreign policy objectives with Mexico and
much of Latin America would be enhanced only through the trilateral
trade arrangement. Since Japan is not directly involved in U.S.-Latin
American relations, and since Japanese trading companies undoubtedly
view Mexican involvement in the TAPS trade as a complicating factor in
the negotiation of contracts, lack of Japanese support for trilateral trade
is understandable.
From a foreign policy and national security perspective, it is in the
best interests of the United States to export Alaskan crude oil to Ja-
pan.195 The economic power and suasion of Japan's pro U.S., democrati-
1 M. Hoyler, supra note 139, at 6.
1' Although Japan is the third largest industrial power in the world, its economy is
99.8 percent dependent upon imported oil with 69 percent supplied by the Middle East. See
supra notes 87-95 and accompanying text. This high level of dependence makes Japan high-
ly susceptible to economic or political blackmail by oil suppliers. Nothing points this out as
clearly as the Iranian hostage crisis. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
The export of Alaskan oil to Japan would lessen Japan's dependence on Middle Eastern
oil by as much as 29 percent making the United States Japan's second largest supplier of oil.
See supra notes 140-143 and accompanying text. Had the United States been in this posi-
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cally elected government operates to anchor U.S. security and diplomatic
interests throughout all of Asia.
The export of Alaskan crude to Japan should enhance U.S. influence
with Japan over a wide front of diplomatic dealings that in all probability
will not be confined to energy related matters. As previously stated, trade,
in addition to energy considerations, may have motivated Prime Minister
Nakasone to raise the issue of Alaskan oil exports with President Reagan
during their recent meeting.19 e Japanese trade negotiators believe that if
Japan could buy Alaskan crude, the U.S. trade deficit with Japan would
be substantially cut, thus reducing pressure for Japan to make trade con-
cessions to the United States.' The opposite, however, could also be
true. As Japan becomes dependent on Alaskan crude oil U.S. suasion over
Japan will increase, making it harder for Japanese trade negotiators to
avoid giving their U.S. counterparts concessions for the import of items
such as beef and citrus products. The leverage used by the United States
would not be unlike that used by OPEC members to obtain Japanese in-
dustrial development projects in their respective home countries.'9 8
The repeal of section 7(d) of the Export Administration Act 99 would
provide the United States with a clear foreign policy advantage in dealing
with Japan. 00 However, an amendment to section 7(d) to provide for a
trilateral trade involving Mexico has relatively more important foreign
policy advantages for the United States with respect to Mexico and Latin
America, 0 1 not the least of which is providing substantial financial assis-
tance to Mexico at no cost to the United States.
The trilateral trade arrangement provides increased revenues to
Mexico in the following manner. Oil flows from Mexico to the Gulf Coast
of the United States to replace TAPS crude sent to Japan and dollars
flow from the United States to Mexico to pay for that crude. An
equivalent amount of TAPS crude is sold to Mexico, but sent directly
from Alaska to Japan. This effectively diverts a revenue stream, presently
flowing from Japan to the Middle East,20 ' into Mexico. Since the United
tion at the time of the hostage crisis, Japan would have had no choice but to strongly align
with the U.S. sanctions.
1" See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
'17 See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
198 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1979, at D10.
NO Repeal of section 7(a) would allow Alaskan oil exports, but would not provide for a
source of U.S. imports.
200 See supra note 195-198 and accompanying text.
201 The financial stability of Mexico is an important foreign policy concern of the Rea-
gan Administration. Currently, Mexico is $80 billion in debt and on the verge of bank-
ruptcy. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. The trilateral trade proposal is designed
to save Mexico from insolvency in the face of falling oil prices.
122 Presumably, Japan's imports of Alaskan oil would be at the expense of Middle East-
ern sources. Therefore, the dollars flowing from Japan to the United States, and later, from
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States is buying and selling an equal amount of quality-adjusted Persian
Gulf-priced oil,203 the transaction has no impact upon the United States
balance of trade position. The well-head price in Mexico, increases, how-
ever, resulting in greater net revenues for the Mexican government.2 '
In addition to providing Mexico with much needed hard currency it
also provides a tangible demonstration of U.S. interest in Latin America
at a time when U.S. relations in that part of the world are weak. 20 5 Latin
Americans will see that the United States is interested in the welfare of
its Latin neighbors and is prepared to use its trade policy to their benefit.
Early in his administration, President Reagan put forth the Carib-
bean Basin Initiative as a means of expressing U.S. concern for Latin
America.206 Although the Caribbean Basin Initiative was largely received
apathetically by the Latins, 207 Mexico actively supported the President.20 8
If framed properly the trilateral trade arrangement could be portrayed as
part of the Caribbean Basin Initiative and a reward to Mexico for its sup-
port. This will give the President's Caribbean Basin Initiative new life.
Implementation of a trilateral trade arrangement, however, would
have some negative side effects. One segment of the U.S. economy, U.S.
flag oil tankers, would be severely injured.20 9 Oil shipped point to point in
the United States is subject to the Jones Act.2 10 Jones Act vessels must be
built in U.S. shipyards and crewed by American seamen.2 1 The cost of
building and operating a U.S. flag vessel is roughly double that of a for-
eign vessel. Were the coastal trade of the United States open to foreign
competition, U.S. flag vessels would not be competitive. 2 2 Those U.S.
vessels which operate in international trade do so under heavy subsidy
from the government of the United States.21 3
the United States to Mexico are revenues which in the past have gone to the Middle East.
203 That is, the exports of Alaskan oil to Japan are offset by equal imports of Mexican
oil.
2o4 See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
205 The statement made is the opinion of Mr. Sheldon Z. Kaplan based on his knowl-
edge and experience in this area.
206 See supra note 169 and accompanying text.
207 Supra note 205.
208 Id.
200 M. Hoyler, supra note 139, at 5-6; D. Lindahl, supra note 140, at 3.
:10 46 U.S.C. § 883 (1976).
001 Id.
21:2 DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, IMPACT ON THE U.S. TANKER INDUSTRY OF THE REMOVAL
OF RESTRAINTS ON THE EXPORT OF DOMESTIC CRUDE OIL AND PETROLEUM PRODUCTS 2 (1981)
(internal memorandum) [hereinafter cited as IMPACT ON TANKER INDUSTRY]..
213 See Merchant Marine Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 835, 49 Stat. 1985 (1936). The
United States maintains this expensive system of merchant shipping preferences and subsi-
dies for national defense reasons. Shipyards to build naval vessels, a U.S. merchant fleet to
supplement and resupply the armed forces during an emergency, and trained merchant
seamen to be called into service on short notice are absolutely essential to the security of
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If export controls are lifted, TAPS oil presently flowing to the Gulf
will go to Japan. Since the Valdez to Japan route is in international trade,
Jones Act vessels would no longer be required.1
14
The vessels in question2 15 are not cost competitive in international
trade and probably would become idle. An estimated 2,840 American
merchant seamen would lose their jobs.2 1 6 Many of these vessels have
been built with Title XI loan guarantees, a form of U.S. government di-
rect subsidies.217 Outstanding guarantees on these vessels, which are obli-
gations of the U.S. Treasury, are estimated at not more than $593 mil-
lion.218 The loss of these tankers represents an 18 percent reduction in the
number of vessels in the U.S. flag tanker fleets and a 31 percent reduction
in tonnage.2 1 9 The Department of Defense would like to purchase seven-
teen of the tankers in order to assure that there is adequate tanker capac-
ity to meet our national defense needs, thus raising the potential cost to
the taxpayer an additional 140-190 million dollars.2 20
One possible compromise is for Congress to mandate that 50 percent
of the oil exported from Alaska to Japan be carried on Jones Act tankers.
The establishment of a trilateral trade arrangement has the added advan-
tage that Congress could also mandate that 50 percent of the trade with
Mexico be carried on U.S. flag tankers. No data is presently available on
the number of jobs which would be saved by these two potential com-
promises. It is known, however, that the route from Valdez to Japan
would involve the use of less than ten very large tankers. Lack of deep
water on the east coast of the United States would result in a larger num-
ber of smaller tankers carrying oil over a relatively short haul on the
Mexico to U.S. leg.
Most understandably, the principal opponents to the lifting of export
controls on TAPS oil are the U.S. maritime interests. They have a very
strong and effective lobby in Washington, D.C. which can be expected to
fight as a hard as possible in the best interests of its members.
VI. THE TRILATERAL TRADE: A LEGISLATIVELY EXPEDIENT SOLUTION
Past efforts to repeal the export controls on TAPS crude oil have
this country.
214 46 U.S.C. § 883 (1976).
21'5 Currently, about fifty-five Jones Act tankers are involved in the transportation of
Alaskan oil to the U.S. Gulf Coast. The opening of the Trans-Panama pipeline is expected
to reduce this number to forty-nine. M. Hoyler, supra note 139, at 14-15.
216 Id. at 6, 15.
217 Id. at 15.
1 Id. at 16.
219 IMPACT ON TANKER INDuSTRY, supra note 212, at 3.
220 M. Hoyler, supra note 139, at 4.
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failed largely because the issue's complexities run counter to the Ameri-
can public's fundamental view of appropriate energy resource manage-
ment practices. 221 This view occurs for several reasons: (1) the average
person has neither heard of the term "net back" nor studied the implica-
tions in the export of oil to Japan; (2) there is a common perception that
exporting oil runs contrary to our national security interest; (3) the coin-
cidence of high unemployment in the United States and the U.S. trade
posture with Japan has created such a negative impression of that nation
that the American public does not want to do anything that would assist
the Japanese; and, (4) the public believes anything good for the oil indus-
222 fctry must be bad for consumers. The fact that the Treasury loses one
billion dollars per year as a result of export controls,223 that national se-
curity would be enhanced with the lifting of controls,224 in addition to the
improvement of the U.S. negotiating leverage with Japan on trade is-
sues,225 is buried in the rhetoric of the Congressional debates and the in-
stinctive anti-export emotions of the voting public.
If a proposal to lift export controls is to be successfully dealt with
before Congress it must be based on some principal of public policy which
the American public recognizes and supports. Unlike a repeal of section
7(d) of the Export Administration Act, an amendment to the Act provid-
ing for trilateral trade with Mexico has such a feature.
Mexico's present financial predicament has been well publicized in
the United States. 228 The American public appears to be genuinely con-
cerned about Mexico's future and would presumably support measures to
assist Mexico. If the Export Administration Act were amended as pro-
posed in this article, Mexico would be assured of receiving a revenue
stream which presently flows from Japan to the Middle East. 2 As a po-
litical matter, the position favoring the elimination of export controls on
TAPS oil can be explained to the American people and Congress as a
means of ensuring the financial solvency of Mexico. Further, under a tri-
lateral trade agreement, the American public knows that the resulting im-
ports of oil come from Mexico, a politically stable next door neighbor, and
not the Middle East.
Such an amendment would be simple. It need only delete the words
221 The statement made is the opinion of the author based on the accumulation of his
knowledge and experience in this area.
222 Id.
223 See supra note 193 for an estimate of increased revenues expected from decontrol.
224 See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
225 See supra notes 144-145 and accompanying text.
226 See, e.g., Washington Post, Aug. 31, 1982, at D6; Wall St. J., Aug. 19, 1982, at 2;
Wall St. J., Aug. 16, 1982, at 1.
227 See supra note 202 and accompanying text.
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"to be refined and consumed therein."22 The resulting change would al-
low the sale of oil to Mexico, but would free the Mexicans to dispose of
the oil as they see fit. Market forces would cause the oil to be sold to
Japan.229 (In practice oil sold to Mexico would be shipped directly from
Valdez, Alaska to Japan.)
The format of the amendment has certain other advantages. Propo-
nents could argue before Congress that the amendment does not overturn
the will of past Congresses. By amending rather than repealing the Act,
Congress will not have to admit that its past actions were incorrect. This
is particularly important for those members of Congress who have voted
in favor of export controls in the past. In pragmatic terms, an amendment
to the Act, rather than a repeal of the pertinent section, allows members
to support a program for exports of TAPS crude without having to ex-
plain to their constituencies why they switched positions on the issue.
Furthermore, the inclusion of the previously outlined compromise regard-
ing the use of Jones Act tankers in the international trade of oil between
Alaska and Japan, and between Mexico and the east coast, offers a signif-
icant concession to the maritime interests which strongly opposed the lift-
ing of export controls. The number of maritime jobs created by the obli-
gatory carriage of a percentage of the oil transported between Mexico and
the United States and the carriage of a percentage of the oil transported
between Valdez and Japan, might be sufficient to pick up a critical num-
ber of votes. 230
If the Export Administration Act is amended, export controls under
the TAPS Act will still be in force. This should pose little problem, how-
ever, since they can be lifted by the President.231 It is most improbable
that the Export Administration Act could be amended without President
Reagan's support. Similarly, if Congress amends the Export Administra-
tion Act, it is most improbable that it would move to disapprove the
President's lifting of TAPS Act controls, especially given that the legisla-
tive veto provision in the TAPS Act is in all probability un-
constitutional. 2
3 2
VII. CONCLUSION
The conditions in existence when export controls on Alaskan oil were
first enacted have changed utterly. Congress must show an ability and
12 See text of section 7(d), supra note 10.
22 See supra notes 180-185 and accompanying text.
2' While these points seem trivial when compared to the overriding national issues of
export controls on TAPS oil, these types of issued often decide hotly contested Congres-
sional debates.
131 50 U.S.C. app. § 2406(d)(2) (Supp. V 1981).
232 See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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willingness to respond to rapidly changing circumstances so that the
United States can remain competitive. Senator Frank Murkowski con-
tends that the export controls are economically inefficient, harm the U.S.
economy and must be removed in order -to: (1) strengthen relationships
with Japan and our other Pacific Rim neighbors; (2) minimize economi-
cally inefficient trade barriers and the concomitant retaliatory responses
that result from such barriers; (3) encourage international cooperation
and fair trade; and, (4) promote national security. 33 Ultimately, these
sorts of export controls merely harm the U.S. economy by unnecessarily
interfering with free trade in the marketplace.
233 Letter from Senator Frank H. Murkowski to the author (Feb. 24, 1983) (available in
the office of the Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law). Senator Murkowski is
the Chairman of the East Asian Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
His statement, prepared specifically for this article, is reproduced in the Appendix.
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Appendix
Statement of Senator Frank H. Murkowski
The review of the Reagan Administration of the proposals to lift a
ban on exports of American crude oil from Alaska's North Slope reserves
has been subject to close scrutiny in recent weeks, and now that most
arguments, pro and con, are being heard, the chances for relaxing restric-
tions are improving.
Opponents of oil export argue that oil sales would ease our bilateral
trade deficit and reduce the pressure on Japan to open markets to U.S.
goods. Let's remember that exports of 100,000 barrels per day will only
change the trade deficit by approximately $1 billion. Although each bil-
lion is important, it cannot be argued that a $1 billion reduction in a $20
billion deficit will be sufficient to abandon our quest for reciprocity in
trade.
If our bilateral trade deficit with Japan is adjusted not only as a re-
sult of oil exports but also due to changes in Japanese import policies
sensitive to the needs of U.S. exporters, then I believe Congress and the
Administration may find it in the U.S. interest to remove the ban prohib-
iting exports of crude oil. It should also be noted that the oil export ques-
tion is not limited strictly to Japan. Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand, for
instance, have also expressed interest in Alaskan oil.
One of the more important aspects that must be realized and empha-
sized in discussions regarding this issue is the potential for improving
world conditions by strengthening our bilateral relationships with our Pa-
cific Rim neighbors, especially Japan. Growth in international trade since
World War II has occurred more rapidly than economic growth generally.
We must recognize that international trade is essential to the prosperity
of our nation and all nations. For instance, in 1981, our exports amounted
to 7.8% of U.S. gross national product. In Japan that figure is 14%, and
in other nations it is substantially higher. I know that in the State I re-
present, Alaska, one in every six jobs is trade related. Other States are
even more dependent upon the export market.
I believe we must seek equity in our trade relations, but also, we
should not lose sight of the obvious benefits each nation gains from in-
creased bilateral trade. The U.S. is not the only world leader in trade
today, and we must learn and effectively utilize the power of persuasion
and become more sensitive to the legitimate needs and interests of others.
Likewise, countries like Japan must recognize the dynamic restructuring
U.S. industry is undergoing today.
Changes in our crude oil export laws are possible if both principal
parties involved, the U.S. and Japan, acknowledge and are sensitive to
each others needs and interests and subsequently act in response to those
needs. Those in the U.S. who oppose export might reexamine the propo-
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nents' arguments for export and note how energy and national security
interests in the U.S. and amongst our Pacific Rim neighbors will be en-
hanced by allowing crude oil export. Allowing exports could also provide
additional incentive for increased exploration, especially for oil not sub-
ject to windfall profits tax. More importantly is the signal allowing oil
exports will send to our allies regarding our long-term security and free
world trade commitments through cooperation rather than adversative
legislation that mandates "fair trade," a term in itself difficult to define.
For crude oil exports to become a reality, the Japanese must be fully
cognizant of past trade practices and the subsequent impact of U.S. in-
dustries, and implement measures concillatory to the legitimate demands
made by businesses affected in the U.S. They must also be sensitive to
any possible dislocations that may occur within our maritime fleet and
shipbuilding industry, and be prepared to assist directly in lessening that
impact to these vitally important industries.
I am hopeful and confident that measures being considered today
will approach this issue from a multi-faceted perspective and try to bal-
ance some of the apparently conflicting concerns of the principal parties
involved. As one representative voice among my 99 colleagues in the Sen-
ate who will also be considering the oil export question, I feel that it can
potentially provide a means to address, and solve, many interrelated
problems that our nation is facing today, and set the stage for similar
problems we will confront in the future.
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